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CHAPTER 6
THE PARTITION DECISION
(A.)  THE UNSCOP RATIONALE FOR PARTITION
Before we get to the decision by the United Nations as a whole to
support partition by a two-thirds majority, it is helpful to review the
considerations that made UNSCOP, or, at least the majority in UNSCOP, favour
partition.  The brief Memorandum in the archives of the UNSCOP committee
entitled, "Justification for the Partition Decision"1 follows the line of
argument of Emil Sandstrom, the Chairman, and is written in the form of a
legal brief citing facts, rights and mitigating circumstances.  The rights
rather than facts are cited first in terms of the valid and irreconcilable
national rights of the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine.  Regardless
of historic or legal claims, the reality of two conflicting groups -- 600,000
Jews and 1,200,000 Arabs is fundamental and only partition could provide a
final decision to that reality since, "There is meager (sic) evidencd that any
hope for political cooperation in Palestine for Arabs and Jews can be
justified".2  This blow was clearly aimed at the Federal scheme but also at
the rationale behind the Zionist case.  This is in direct contrast to the
centrepiece of the Jewish case as presented by Dr. Silver who argued before
the Special Session of the General Assembly setting up UNSCOP that the Jewish
case was primarily a legal and historical one.  
To treat the Palestine problem as if it were one of merely 
reconciling the differences between two sections of the 
population presently inhabiting the country, or of finding 
a haven for a certain number of refugees and displaces 
persons, will only contribute to confusion.
   The Balfour Declaration which was issued by His Majesty's 
Government as `a declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist 
aspirations' declares:  `His Majesty's Government view with 
favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for 
the Jewish people.  The Mandate, in its preamble, 
recognizes, `the historical connection of the Jewish people 
with Palestine' and `the grounds for reconstituting' `their 
national home in that country.'
   These international commitments of a quarter of a century 
ago, which flowed from the recognition of the historic 
rights and of present needs, and upon which so much has 
already been built in Palestine by the Jewish people, 
cannot now be erased.  Certainly, the United Nations, 
guided by its great principle proclaimed in its Charter, 
`to establish conditions under which justice and respect 
for the obligations arising from treaties and other 
sources of international law can be maintained', can 
never sanction the violations of treaties and of 
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international law.3
UNSCOP would not sanction violating the Mandate of the League of Nations, but
neither would it make the legality of the Jewish claim and the obligations of
international law the centre of its decision.
Partition was based on reality.  Partition was final.  Partition was
based on recognition of rights and claims of both communities.  Partition ws
the only alternative given these realities and goals.  It had the additional
merit of placing primary economic and political responsibility for its
implementation on the two communities themselves rather than on some outside
bodies.  But the key factor was immigration.
Jewish immigration is the central political issue in 
Palestine today and is the one factor, above all others, 
which makes impossible any effective political cooperation 
between the Arab and Jewish communities in a single 
state.4
The Minority Reports of the three dissenters favouring a federal solution was
based on controlling immigration of Jews to Palestine, a control placed in the
hands of a higher federal structure.  The Majority Report recognized taht this
minority proposal would solve neither the wishes of the Arabs for an Arab
unitary state with Jewish minority rights nor the Jewish insistence on their
sovereign right to control immigration.  Though the proposed Jewish state had
to be given the right to control immigration, it did not have to be given the
borders necessary to solve the Jewish problem as a whole.  The Jews were
granted sufficient borders to allow for immigration and further development,
but, given the resources and potential development in that territory, not
enough to threaten the position of the Arabs.
It is clear that both the Minority and Majority Reports did not envision
unlimited Jewish immigration to Palestine, but the Majority Report in granting
sovereign control to the Jewish state gave the right to decide on the number
of immigrants to that state.  The Minority Report ruled out granting such
rights.  "No claim to a right of unlimited immigration of Jews into Palestine,
irrespective of time, can be entertained."5  But the Minority Report went
further. 
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     7One more item needs to be mentioned -- an item which echoed the original
Bunche report's interpretation of Jewish nationalism as merely a product of
persecution and not an inherent characteristic of Jews.  But supporters of the
Minority Report went further in echoing the old canard of double-loyalty. 
Only this time it was not based on the old rationale that it was a product of
Jews being Jews, but on the new grounds that it was a product of Jews being
Jewish nationalists.  "Before Hitler most Jews in the world were entirley
loyal to the particular state in which they had residence, and since,
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classic sense, but merely an attitude brought out of the desperation inspired
by Jewish persecution in Europe and the fear of persecution to come." 
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No basis could exist for any anticipation that the Jews 
now in Palestine might increase their numbers by free 
mass immigration to such extent that they would become 
the majority of the population in Palestine.6
The Jews would not have a right to immigrate.  The Arabs would have a right to
limit Jewish immigration.  The rights of the indigenous population to remain a
majority was given primacy.  But it was not absolute, since internationals
were to mediate between the Jews and Arabs on the federal level guided by the
principles of absorptive capacity and the presevation of an Arab majority. 
But it was a far cry from the position of the Arab Higher Committee which not
only banned future Jewish immigration absolutely, but designated most Jews
within Palestine, those who arrived after 1917, as illegals subject to
deportation.
Clearly, Jewish immigration was the central dividing point between the
Minority and Majority Reports.  The view on immigration was in part dictated
by the view of Jews and of Jewish nationalism.7  Economic union, the gift
wrapper of the Majority Report and the legal wrapping of the Majority Report
were just that -- wrappings -- a rationale to give a semblance      impose a   
       where none was present.  In the Majority Report, the justification
ended with a weak plea for economic unity "to the extent feasible" and
"consistent with the creation of two independent states".  It was an add-on, a
desirable feature to secure the economic and social well-being of the
inhabitants, but there is no argument for its necessity.
What is more important in this document defending partition is the
absence of any justificatin for excluding Jerusalem from the Partition scheme
and setting it up as an autonomous region.  We shall return t this lapse later
but it would be helpful to examine the rationale more closely -- the existence
of two irreconcilable communities, the finality of the decision, placing
primary responsibility on the inhabitants, sovereign control over immigration
limited by the land available and the value of economic unity.
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(B.)  THE ROLE OF COERCIVE AND CREATIVE POWER
The Majority Report favouring partition was not premised on the use of
coercive power but on the Arabs and Jews assuming the political and economic
responsibility for the consequences of their action, thereby, the committee
believed, ameliorating the passions of the moment.8  This was not true of the
minority report.  The minority argued that in spite of the intense enmity
between Arabs and Jews, "it is extremely possible that if a federal solution
wer firmly and definitively imposed (my italics), the two groups, in their own
self-interest, would gradually develop a spirit of cooperation in their common
state".9  The Chairman of UNSCOP recognized this difference between the two
solutions. 
Partition is the only means available by which political 
and economic responsibility can be placed squarely in 
both Arabs and Jews, with the prospective results that 
confronted with responsibility for bearing fully the 
consequences of their own actions, a new and important 
element of political amelioration will be introduced.  
In the proposed federal state solution this factor would 
be lacking, and an effort must be made by an imposed 
constitution to induce that will to cooperate in the 
political realm which has always been a basic condition 
for an effective union.10 
There was a paradox behind both positions.  The federal solution
depended on eventual cooperation between the two communities but required
force as a condition of its implementation.  The minority only had hope that
it could work since, as the Majority Report so correctly pointed out,
cooperation cannot be forced, particularly when the central issue separating
the two communities was immigration.  And the two communities were so
diametrically in conflict in this issue.
The Majority Report was no less paradoxical in arguing that political
and economic responsibility would modify passions.  The basis of the Arab and
Jewish position was passion, a passion for the survival of their own
communities.  The fundamental positions of the other party directly threatened
the other group.  The predominance of Arab nationalism in palestine was
fundamentally threatened by Zionism.  The creation of a national home in
Palestine with sovereign rights of self-determination for Jews, including the
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right to come to Palestine, was fundamentally threatened by a hegemonous Arab
nationalism.  If the two communities were irreconcilable, this was the reason. 
And there was no reason to expect economic and political responsibilities to
mitigate these passions when the primary purpose of economics and politics for
the major leaders was to serve the fulfillment of these passions.  
One might at best separate the two communities.  But how could a
decision which placed as many Arabs as Jews in the Jewish state achieve such
separation?  Further, who would maintain the separation if primary
responsibility was placed in each of these communities?
Thus, the Minority Report seemed more realistic in recognizing that a
solution would have to be imposed.  As the expert testimony of Sir Alan
Cunningham, the Palestine High Commission declared, "Whatever solution you
find must be imposed."11  The Majority Report, however, was more realistic in
recognizing there was or would be no one available to impose a solution.
On the other hand, cooperation could not be enforced.  On the other
hand, you could not get even minimal cooperation -- a prerequisite of the
Majority Report -- without force.  These paradoxes were not the products of
UNSCOP but of the situation they faced.  Though this was the central one, it
was complicated and made virtually impossible to resolve by other factors.
Immigration, the central dividing issue, if it was to be allowed into
the Jewish state as the very rationale for that separate Jewish state, meant,
given the beliefs of the time, setting aside enough development land to absorb
the new immigrants, but not enough to fulfill the Zionist program of creating
a homeland for all Jews.  How much was enough?
This calculation was influenced by the committee's view of the
creativity of the Jews in restoring the land and not just the objective
factors of calculating how much land would be needed to settle 250,000
refugees from Europe.  (The committee did not predict that another 600,000
would flee Arab lands as a            of the passions aroused by partition.) 
it is clear in the minutes of UNSCOP meetings, that most members were
impressed by the efforts of Jews to redeem the land.  In the 46th meeting of
UNSCOP held in Geneva on August 27th, Ivan Rand argued for giving the Negev to
the Jews (in spite of the fact that the Negev contained 3,000 Jews and 100,000
Arabs) "otherwise it would remain sterile and useless".12
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Unlike the Negev, however, the ratio of Arabs to Jews in the Western
Galilee13 was even higher -- 122,000 : 3,000.14  And, unlike the Bedouin, they
were a politically conscious group.  The committee had to weigh common
development focussed on Jews and new immigrants versus the existing
distribution of population.  "In the district of Lake Heilah basin there is a
great scheme of reclamation in progress which works under the concession
acquired by the Jewish Agency."15  Most committee members took into
consideration in their judgements -- though giving different weights and
emphasis -- the creative impact of Jews into the territory.  It was not a
factor that decided in favour of partition or a federal scheme; it was a
factor that influenced the recommendations on boundaries of the partition
scheme.
Another example was the shore of the Dead Sea.  
In my opinion (Lisicky was speaking) the whole sub-district 
of Beersheba should be included in the Jewish State.  It 
means that the Jewish State should have a part of the shore 
of the Dead Sea, where there is a factory of the Palestine 
Potash Company.  I think it is justified because it is a 
company which was created and developed by Jewish brains.16
The creative power was not only the dedication, the discipline, and the will
of the Jews, but as Fabregat worded it to Granados after viewing a kibbutz,
"What a decent and straightforward life those people live!  Who could doubt
their honesty, their sincerety, their humanity."17
(C.)  ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES
In addition to the role of coercive power of each scheme and the
potential of creative energies to deal with the land itself, the committee
could have taken into account "influence", the persuasive political power and
the material influence of the two groups on their own states.  This was
clearly the major or a major motive of the Balfour Declaration itself -- to
garner Jewish influence on the side of the allies, particularly on the U.S.A. 
It was also a major factor in the 1939 White Paper -- to try to cater to the
Arab states whom they did not want to alienate because of their oil and,
hence, eoncomic strategic importance.
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The rival influences of the Arabs and Jews would be critical to the
roles of the Great Powers in dealing with the UNSCOP report.  "The paramount
aim (of British policy) was to remain on good terms with the Arabs as well as
the Americans."18  The major aim of the Americans was to remain on good terms
with the Arabs and its Jewish domestic constituency while keeping the Soviet
Union and its own troops out of the Middle East.  The U.S.S.R. served as a
foil for British obstinacy and American vacillation became its major aim was
to evict the British from the Middle East -- the only item on which both Arabs
and Jews agreed in principle -- and to give itself some international and
regional standing if possible while also attempting to 
win support among Western public opinion, notably among 
what it considered or termed its `progressive' groupings.  
The Jews as a traditionally non-conformist element and an 
influential group in Western and particularly American 
`society and politics, were an obvious target of Soviet 
propaganda.19
Thus, all the major parties were subject to the economic and political
influences of both Arabs and Jews.  Was UNSCOP?
Of the two forms of influence -- the influence of economic material
factors and of political arguments and persuasion -- the material factors were
given far more weight in the committee's consideration.  But it was not Arab
international economic influence but local Jewish economic influence which
attracted their attention.  Further, an examination of the consideration of
those factors suggests that argument, not economic reality, dictated that
perception.
The predominant concern was the division of land with development
potential.  Economic absorptive capacity was a consideration for limiting
immigration and the economic viability of a two state solution.  For example,
most members agreed that immigration to the Jewish state be limited by the
economic absorptive capacity of taht state.  In fact, one of the arguments
against the federal proposal was that it would entail a new committee to study
that absorptive capacity, thereby delaying again the resolution of an urgent
problem.  Further, 
during the three-year transitional period, immigration 
would be determined by an international body in which 
not only the United Nations but members of both groups 
would be represented.  But after the three-year period, 
only the government of Palestine would have the right 
to dictate the policies of the country.  Thus, being an 
     20Garcia-Granados, p. 51  A/AC.13/P.V. 46   DAG-13/3.0. 1:2.
     21ibid., p. 52.
     22p. 93.  cf. Granados (1948), p. 93.
Arab government, they undoubtedly will forbid Jewish 
immigration into Palestine.20
On the other hand, if immigration was allowed, it owuld only be a meaningful
provision if sufficient territory was given to the Jews.  
If we do not provide adequate territory for the Jews, 
no plan will work.  The Arabs have the possibility of 
Jewish economic help.  The Jews will not help the Arabs 
if they do not have territory enough to use as a 
background, as an agricultural background for their 
economic development.  This is why, although I recognize 
the Galilee is populated by Arabs, I think that the only 
way to receive a certain number of immigrants into 
Palestine is to give Galilee to the Jews.21
The Jews were rich.  The Jews were talented and westernized.  But note,
unlike the Balfour Declaration or the White Paper, the issue was not the
benefit to the decision makers but to the enemies of the Jews.  The Jews would
help the economic development of the Arabs.
If a Jewish State were set up, it would be essentially 
an industrial state, and its effect on this entire part 
of the world would be most significant.  Its impact on 
the backward economy of the neighboring Arab countries 
would help transform them from semi-feudal, semi-colonial 
nations into modern progressive ones.22
But these were precisely Ben Gurion's arguments.  There was no evidence of
Jewish investment directly assisting Arabs, though there was evidence of
extensive indirect benefits.  In fact, the Arabs argued that this very point
was a defence of economic imperialism which they feared (perhaps, in part, to
protect the feudal interests of landowners and the exploitive practices of
Arab capitalists).  Further, economic absorptive capacity was an agricultural
conception -- no country should absorb more immigrants than the numbers for
which its land had the potential to grow food.  It later became an industrial
concept -- no country should absorb new immigrants at a faster rate than its
capacity to provide jobs for the newcomers.  but if the new Jewish state was
to be an agricultural one, then land was needed in which the Jews could
settle.  But that would only help the Arabs indirectly by allowing them to
improve their yields per acre by following the advanced agricultural
techniques of the Jews.  On the other hand, if the new Jewish state was to be
a centre of industry and manufacturing, the Jews would settle in urban centres
and extensive land would not be a requisite.  The only role, then, for the
Arabs would be to serve as a resident body of labour for Jewish manufacturers. 
In either case, the economic absorptive argument seemed irrelevent, either as
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an argument to limit Jewish immigration or benefit the existing Arab
populaiton through importing Jewish capital and brains.  But absorptive
capacity was the dogma of the times as a determinant of immigration policy.
The economic influences considered critical to UNSCOP were diametrically
at opposite poles to the economic influences affecting British and American
policy makers.  The political influences also were at odds.  British, American
and soviet policy was dictated by their respective imperial interests while
trying to satisfy or win the support of different constituencies.  UNSCOP did
not have a constituency.  While recommending partition did win qualified and,
subsequently, enthusiastic Jewish support, there is no suggestion in the
discussion of the Special Committee that the need to win this support
influenced its decision.  Certainly, the Special Committee knew from its
inception that it could not win Arab support.  Even its pro-partition stance
was not a product of the Zionist rationale since the rationale of the UNSCOP
majority report was not at odds with the cetrpiece of Zionist rationale as the
opening remarks of this chapter indicate.
UNSCOP did not have a constituency which it had to satisfy.  At least it
did not appear at first glance to have one, but an examination of the records
of UNSCOP and its recommendations on Jerusalem does indicate that UNSCOP was
influenced by its own internal politics and the imperial interests of the U.N.
as a product of an ideology of internationalism so at odds with the
nationalist Arab/Zionist dispute at which it found itself in the centre.
(D.)  JERUSALEM
To discuss Jerusalem one must begin with the position of Garcia Salazar
of Peru who formed part of the working group on partition because he favoured
two separate Arab and Jewish states with separate territories.  But the workin
group, to that date, was unable to come up with a workable and agreed plan of
territorial partition.  Consequently, Salazar announced on Aug. 27, 1947 that
"I am no longer in favour of partition, which this plan has not been carved
out".23  To create a plan of two states without a territorial plan was no
recommendation at all.  Further, Salazar wanted a greatly enlarged Arab state
and a Jewish state reduced to the Jewish population centres, contrary to most
members of the working group who wanted to provide some room to absorb
immigrants.
Salazar then signalled he was swinging over to the federal solution for,
"There is no territorial problem.  There is no problem of minorities.  There
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is no problem of Jerusalem."24  It was Jerusalem that swung Salazar's vote back
on the side of partition -- not the issue of too many Arabs in Jewish
territory, not the issue of the difficulty in settling the boundaries.
As Garcia-Granados noted the situation at that stage of the committee's
deliberations --
Our positions at this stage were as follows:  Fabregat 
wanted the Jewish State to include the whole of the 
Galilee, the Negev west of Beersheba, and a large 
indentation connecting the coastal plan with Jerusalem.  
The Jewish part of Jerusalem would become part of the 
Jewish State.  He proposed that Jaffa should be an 
enclave in the Arab State.  Rand thought Jerusalem and 
its envisions should be an international city, part 
neither of the Jewish nor the Arab State.  My position 
was the same as Rand's, but I did not agree to his idea 
of a free city of Jerusalem, keeping that as a future 
bargaining asset. (my italics)25
In other words, at that stage Granados waas holding out his commitment on
internationalizing Jerusalem as a bargain chip for more land for the Jewish
state.
I spoke first to Garcia Salazar, and offered to drop my 
opposition to a free city of Jerusalem if he would support 
my proposal to extend the Jewish State's coastal strip to 
the Lebanese border, and then have it run parallel to that 
border until it joined Eastern Galilee.  I also devised 
two narrow international corridors, each the width of a 
road, one at the north the other at the south, at points 
where the two states intersected.  The northern corridor 
would allow the Arabs to have Acre and the rest of Western 
Galilee, and would give the Jews communication between the 
coastal plain and Eastern Galilee.  Similarly, the southern 
corridor would provide communication between the Negev and 
the Gaza area.26
Garcia-Granados' auto-biographical account where he offers to drop his
opposition to Jerusalem after the August 27th meeting is at odds with the
minutes of that meeting where he explicitly stated, "I think Mr. Rand's
proposal for boundaries and his conciliatory attitude in the matter of
Jerusalem is a good one, and I am in complete agreement with him.  I subscribe
to the idea."27  It is hard to see Salazar accepting then as a trade-off
Granados willing to give up opposition to an autonomous Jerusalem when he had
already given it up.
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That was the key breakthrough.  With one more amendment suggested by
Paul Mohym, Sandstrom's alternative, that the Arabs get the Western Galilee
and the Jews be assigned most of the Negev, the deal was set.  Jerusalem, as
an international city, had been traded for unanimity in the working group on
partition for the borders to be assigned to the Jewish State on a more
generous basis.
It was a great moment.  A sincere desire to reach a 
solution, a largeness of vision which enabled even the 
most bitterly insistent to compromise, had enabled us 
to complete a report of which I felt all of us could be 
justly proud.28
But what to Granados appeared as a spirit of compromise and a largeness of
vision was interpreted by others as political horse trading.  Salazar,
commentators suggested29, gave in to partition in order to gain Christian
influence over Jerusalem given his Vatican leanings.  The internationalization
of Jerusalem, however, was clearly not simply dictated by religious interests
as these would have been satisfied if the holy sites, or even the Old City,
along with the Mount of Olives, Mount Zion, Gethsemene and a             to
Bethlehem had been placed under international jurisdiction.  The proposal for
the internationalization of Jerusalem under the International Trusteeship
System went back to the original Bunche paper before UNSCOP was even formed. 
It was revived by Rand and then used as a trading chip by Granados.  Thus,
Jerusalem as an Autonomous City or Region administered by three appointees
each from both the Jewish and Arab States and three non-Arab Christians by the
Trusteeship Council was dependent on a Trusteeship Agreement with the
Mandatory Power -- an agreement which never came into being.
The only rationale for Jerusalem as an autonomous region is presented in
a part of a memorandum dealing with historical rights and opens its discussion
of "The Problem of the Administration of Jerusalem" with the fears of the
passions aroused by disputes over the control of holy sites.  But whatever the
validity of these fears, and whether they are best handled by placing the
sites under international control is not answered in the memorandum which was
clearly written before the minority group studying partition made its historic
trade-off to shift Fabregat and Lisicky to accept the compromise and Salazar
to revert once again to support partition by supporting the Australian,
Canadian, Dutch, Swedish, and of course, Peruvian position of an Autonomous
zone for the whole of Jerusalem and Bethlehem.
The rationale is so weak and so unrelated to the solution, so rooted in
the original Bunche memorandum to gain a foothold for the U.N. and the idea of
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internationalism, that one cannot help but see the proposal as one dictated by
U.N. self-interests and political trade-offs so as to undermine any image of a
detached, disinterested and morally lofty U.N. position.  Certainly, the U.N.
and internationalist perspective of the position was presented forcefully by
Ivan Rand.  
I am anxious to have the autonomy of Jerusalem preserved 
for the world at large and have that            by an 
administration directly chosen for the nations and 
responsible to the United Nations Organization.30 
(E.)  AUTHENTIC AND FORMAL AUTHORITIES
In addition to coercive and creative power and economic and political
influences as considerations in the recommendations of the committee, there
were also considerations of authority -- both the legal formal authority
behind the respective rights of the Jews and Arabs (and Britain for that
matter) -- and the authentic wisdom of authoritative experts or leaders or
even charismatic figures.  In the deliberations of the committee, the latter
play virtually no role except insofar as Bunche was able to influence the
committee's decision on Jerusalem.  Both the experts available to the
committee or the expertise of experience of the British are given little
credit.  The committee heard the evidence, grants it some due, but the due is
very little.  The direct experience of the senses is of far more importance
than those of expert analysts.  In fact, the British experts were distrusted
by virtually all members of the committee.  The evidence of the Rev. Im-
Gravel, a non-Jewish volunteer who travelled on the Exodus for five months
until its brutal take-over by the British, as given in Judge Sandstrom's flat
on July 28, 1947, was more telling on the impression of the perfidy,
ruthlessness, and inhumanity of the British -- that the people on board had no
weapons, contrary to British claims, that the British used undue force in
taking over the ship, that the British delayed allowing humanitarian help to
the wounded, leading to the death of at least one of those shot.
Legal and formal authority is given some weight, but it is not
determinate as we indicated in the beginning of this chapter.31  Though all of
the committee members gave legal weight and authority, but not determinate
weight and authority, to the Mandate, far greater weight than any of the
agreements cited by the Arabs, in the minutes of the meeting they also seem to
agree -- certainly a majority expressed that view -- that the British did not
fulfill its terms.  Some held that circumstances dictated this failure, others
that Britain imperial interests, subordinated its obligations under the
Mandate to its own national interests.  
The status of the Mandate was legal.  Britain did not fulfill those
legal obligations.  Although the status of the Mandate and the failure to
fulfill its terms gave some weight to the Jewish case, the decision -- in
spite of the preponderance of jurists on the committee -- was not based
primarily on legal entitlement under international law.  The rights of the
majority indigenous population were at least of equal, and, in the case of
those advocating federation, of prepondent weight.
(F.)  WEIGHING THE FACTORS
The decision was not dictated by law or expert witnesses, by material
influences or rhetorical arguments, by the importance of coercive power from
outside sources or the creative powers of the participants.  In each member,
these factors were given different weight.  In reading the recorded
deliberations as a whole one does get the clear impression that three of these
factors were more important -- legal formal authority, material economic
considerations and the role of coercive power.  Of those three -- and this is
a judgement call -- legal formal authority seemed important in giveing the
Jews the right to make the case but not, for most members, in determining the
outcome.  The reality of the numbers of people on the ground, the numbers
needing and wanting to get in and the economic viability of the result was
much more important.  The role of coercive force was an important negative
factor -- the more likely it would be needed to bring about a solution, the
less acceptable that solution was.  In other words, what the committee
considered              was far more important than abstract rights or legal
precedents, intellectual arguments or expertise.
The question now was what weight the U.N. General Assembly members would
give these same factors when they debated the resolution.  Further, by its
very nature, as the body to which UNSCOP made its recommendation, they had to
decide what role the U.N. body wold take once given the recommendation.  They
would also have to take into account new factors -- the response of the Jews
and Arabs to the report, the response of the British and the attitudes of the
two emergent super powers -- the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.
(G.)  THE U.N. ROLE -- LEGISLATOR, ARBITRATOR, MEDIATOR, OR MODERATOR
UNSCOP was an advisory committee to the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Palestine Question.  The Ad Hoc Committee included all the members of the
United Nations.  The UNSCOP Report would first be dealt with in the Ad Hoc
Committee which held its first session on September 16, 1947.  Whatever
resolutions passed by a majority in the Ad Hoc Committee would be forwarded to
the U.N. General Assembly where a two-thirds vote would be required to endorse
them.
One issue facing the U.N. in addition to, and in my mind, as a
precondition of, any decisions on substance and implementation was what role
the U.N. should play in the dispute.  We have already discussed the fact that
the United Nations had not insisted on obtaining legal authority over the
Mandate before it took on the responsibility for recommending a solution to
the problem.  When the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine had been
set up and the U.N. had presumed that any decision made on the basis of any
forthcoming recommendations would rest solely on the moral authority of the
U.N. and even then on the narrowest grounds without any commitment by any
party, but particularly Britain, of cooperation in implementing the decision,
let alone enforcing it.  The United Nations had avoided the issue of
enforcement or even the threat to use force by not referring the issue to the
Security Council as well as including the five major powers on the special
committee.  The UNSCOP report forced the U.N. to face this issue again.
The Minority Report of UNSCOP required the U.N. to become the interim
authority and legislate for Palestine, backed up by the requisite force.  The
Majority Report required the U.N. to assume permanent trusteeship authority
over an autonomous Jerusalem area, but Britain would remain the interim legal
authority with the requisite physical force until the new Arab and Jewish
states came into being.  If the U.N. adopted the Minority Report it would
entail negotiating the assumption of legal authority with the U.K. and
developing a policing instrument.  If the U.N. adopted the Majority Report,
Britain's cooperation was essential to transfer legal trusteeship to the U.N.,
political authority to the Arabs and Jews respectively, and administrative
authority to some sort of transitional regime.  Both the Minority and Majority
Reports required some legislative role for the U.N. and a responsibility for
ensuring force was available to, at a minimum, back up the solution proposed.
UNSCOP did not have to put the U.N. in this position.  Mr. Hood of
Australia (sometimes backed by Blom of the Netherlands, though not in the
final result) abstained from endorsing either the Majority or Minority Report. 
He saw  the primary obligation of the committee as fact finding.  Recommending
a solution was secondary.  Alternatives, with the pros and cons of each, could
have been put to the U.N.  Hood felt that without unanimity on the committee,
or close to it, it was not the prerogative of the Special Committee to make a
recommendation.  The UNSCOP responsibility was only to collect facts and
analyze them to enable the U.N. to make an informed judgement.
The Assembly alone is the competent body to decide what 
is feasible and what is not feasible in the light of all 
factors, including political factors, many of which are 
clearly beyond the scope of our own observations as a 
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Committee.32
This is, of course, why Hood had objected to the Minority Report going
directly to the General Assembly.  He wanted the committee to include it as
part of an analysis of one alternative, subject to the input of other
committee members, as part of an overall coherent report.  Such a course
offered a more detached, distanced and rational perspective.
UNSCOP cannot be faulted for following this course.  The terms of
reference and a number of speeches backing these terms implied clearly that
the committee was to come back with recommendations.  For example, the Swedish
representative had stated that, "the Committee should not be merely a fact-
finding Committee, but a Committee with the duty of making definite
recommendations."33
One point, however, of making recommendations was that they would not be
vetoed by Great Britain because they would carry such "uncontestable moral
force".  But a majority report was no longer uncontestable.  The only
uncontestable part was the unanimous recommendation that the Mandate be
terminated and Britain be asked to leave.  The Majority Report carried not
such "uncontestable" moral force.  Britain could not veto the Majority Report
if its recommendations were passed, but its moral force was insufficient to
oblige Britain to implement it or even cooperate in its implementation.
This is the dilemma the Ad Hoc Special Committee faced when UNSCOP
returned with its report.  The only undisputed recommendation was that Britain
surrender the Mandate and the peoples of palestine be given their
independence.  What form that independence should take was a matter of
dispute.  Neither form recommended included a unitary binational state with
guarantees for the Jewish minority as Britain had expected, let alone one
without such guarantees as the Arab Higher Committee wanted.  The Minority and
Majority Reports both required the U.N. to assume a Trusteeship role, either
over the whole of Palestine or an autonomous district of Jerusalem.  To do
that, Britain's cooperation was required to transfer all or part of the
Mandate to the U.N.  Further, for either Report, force was needed, to impose
the solution recommended in the Minority Report or to back up the local
constabulary set up by each community.
Clearly, either report required the U.N. to act as a legislator and not
just a moderator who brings moral suasion to the disputants to modify and
reduce the respective passions that threaten to be mutually destructive.  Even
if the U.N. merely assumed the role of an arbitrator, where it itself assumed
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no legal authority or enforcement capacity, the legal authority of Britain and
someone's enforcement capacity wold be required.
The substance of the UNSCOP recommendations undercut any U.N. role as a
moderator.  The United Nations was handicapped from the start in playing the
role of a legislator (requiring legal authority and the ability to enforce
that authority) the latter required even if the U.N. assumed the role of an
arbitrator requiring the back-up of a capacity for enforcement.  Could the
U.N. play the role of a mediator, that is, help negotiate a compromise between
the parties on the basis of the recommendation?
But the Arabs had adamantly opposed any U.N. role insisting the Mandate
be turned over immediately to the inhabitants.  When the UNSCOP met with the
Arab Higher Committee in Beirut, the Arabs were asked pointedly by the
Chairman, Emil Sandstrom, that of the U.N. supported partition, "would you
still consider that this Jewish state had been established by violence?  Would
you answer with violence?"34  The Arab spokesman evaded the question.  On the
one hand they were members of the U.N. and committed to the Charter.  But, "If
the United Nations goes beyond that (the Charter), the very existence of a
Jewish State will allow us to be free to make our own decision".35  On the 29th
of September, Jamal el Hussein, the ex-Mufti's cousin and spokesman for the
Arab Higher Committee not only rejected both the Majority and Minority
Reports, but warned they would fight against either solution.  In contrast,
Dr. Abba Hillet Silver, the Chairman of the American Section of the Jewish
Agency, only a few days later accepted the Majority Report ostensibly with
reluctance.
Setting up the committee itself to look into problem, had been fought
against by the Arabs.  Why would the Arabs accept a U.N. mediation role when
neither the Majority nor Minority Reports of its committee were acceptable to
them?  Further, the very way the General Assembly set up UNSCOP and convened
in its regular session to consider the report of the Special Committee on
Palestine ws not conducive to the role of a mediator.  Mediators don't debate
the merits and demerits of proposed solutions themselves; they try to induce
the conflicting parties to consider the merits and demerits and consequences
to themselves if they do not compromise.  Further, the British had been trying
for years to mediate and find a solution acceptable to both parties.  Britain
had failed and it had legal authority and an enforcement capacity to back stop
its efforts.  The U.N. had neither.  The United Nations could not legislate. 
The United Nations could not arbitrate.  The United nations could not even
     36Dr. H.B. Evatt of Australia, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Palestine Question, appointed two subcommittees.  Canada, Czechoslovakia,
Guatemala, Poland, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the U.S.A., Uruguay, and
Venezuela constituted Subcommittee One delegated to draft a detailed plan
based on partition.  Afghanistan, Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan,
Saudi-Arabia, Syria, and Yemen constituted Subcommittee Two who were to draft
a detailed plan based, not on the minority report, but on a unitary,
independent Arab state.  In effect a third subcommittee was constituted headed
by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Evatt, along with Prince S.S. Svastic
of Siam, the Vice-Chairman, and Thon Thon of Iceland, the Rapporteur, along
with three officials entrusted with the last minute and futile effort to
conciliate the Jews and Arabs.
mediate.  The United Nations only had the status of a moderator, a position
which required retaining the good will of both parties towards the moderator
whatever their feelings towards one another.  The Ad Hoc Committee, however,
did not proceed like a moderator.  It proceeded like the committee of a
legislative body playing a zero-sum game.  The issue was which side would win
more spoils and not how could the sides be reconciled, or, at the very least,
how could a judgement be rendered which gave every appearance of neutrality in
its process and consideration.
But if war was inevitable, if the two positions were in fact
irreconcilable, what other choice was there than to simply use the U.N. as a
moral prop for one side or the other and to forget about conciliation or a
neutral procedure?  
That prognosis may, in fact, have been correct.  The cost, however, was
great.  The moral authority of the U.N. as a neutral moderator was sacrificed
and the issue became, "Which side are you on, boys, which side are you on?"
That the latter strategy would govern the whole proceedings was not
obvious in the first session of the Ad Hoc Committee.  That it would be used,
was.  A Swedish-American resolution (backed by the Zionists) proposed that one
committee be formed composed of all U.N. members supporting partition to
develop a plan of implementation for partition.  The proposal that there be
one committee, that it consist only of supporters of partition, that it assume
partition was a fait accompli and only deal with operationalizing it, went too
far.  The resolution was defeated.  
However, it was a tactical defeat and not a strategic one.  The tactic
shifted to "Divide and Rule" rather than "Unite and Rule", but the strategy
focussed on ruling, that is determining who should be the winner in a conflict
between two sides and how to implement that recommendation rther than how to
reconcile the two positions.  The new tactic followed the precedent of UNSCOP. 
Two committees would be formed, one to review and make recommendations on the
majority report and the second to consider any other solution or solutions.36 
That it was a strategy eliminating the U.N. role as moderator is clear in the
memoirs of Horowitz, the liaison person of the Jewish Agency to the United
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Nations.  As he wrote, "we were now able to sway the composition of the
committee.  As it was now to be a body confined to disciples of Partition,
only unconditional supporters were named."37
Horowitz's rationale for this tactic was very clear.  
If, as we dreaded, neutral elements were brought into the 
committee, an attempt would undoubtedly be made to water 
down the plan by offering substantial concessions to Arab 
demands, producing a vague and equivocal formula regarding
constitutional structure, frontiers and enforcement.  A 
hybrid of this sort would make no difference to the Arab 
position and would be rejected by ourselves.  The end 
result:  deadlock again.38
Two committees "reduced the danger of compromise."39
In his words, the win-lose strategy was premised on Arab intransigence
and Jewish determination to see the victory achieved in UNSCOP.  The judges
had made their ruling and the Zionists wnted acceptance of their compromise,
in this case their little piece of Palestine, not a further watering down of
the proposal.
Was the strategy one dictated by the circumstances?  Perhaps, if the
overall circumstances in the world, and, particularly, on the stances taken by
the Arabs and the Jews, are the main touchstones.  But was this also the case
in the Ad Hoc Committee?
Fourteen representatives of the Subcommittee of the U.N. General Asembly
chaired by Lester Pearson, favoured the majority report.  Only one favoured
the minority report.  Eight delegates went back on any compromise and favoured
a unitary state governed by the Arab majority.
If the discussion had shifted to reconciling the federal scheme and the
partition scheme with perhaps a federation built out of independent cantons a
la Switzerland with autonomous controls over immigration, then the strategy of
moderation and compromise might have been adopted.  But the political
representatives on the Ad Hoc Committee did not see it that way.  Those
favouring the Arab position on UNSCOP were viewed as having compromised the
principle of self-determination of the majority (to contrast with the
alternative principle of democracy, respect for minorities).  The tone of
uncompromising principle had already been set by the opponents of the
Zionists.  The federal plan recommended by the UNSCOP minority report was
     40cf. Sneetsinge (1974) who cites The New York Times, October 10, 1947, p.
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never even considered.  Further, the Arab League instructed its members to mve
their troops to the Palestine border if and when Britain withdrew.40
It is at that point that Truman is said to have given up on reconciling
Jews and Arabs in Palestine and, in response to reports of troop movements
towards the Palestine border on October 19th, Truman instructed Herschel
Johnson on October 11th, 1947 to back partition.  As Truman records it in his
Memoirs,
The Arabs' reaction was quite plain.  They did not like 
it.  They made it clear that partition would not be 
carried out except over their forceful opposition.  On 
October 9 I was informed that the Arab League Council had 
instructed the governments of its member states to move 
troops to the Palestine border, ready for later use, and 
the public statements of the Arab leaders were belligerent 
and definite.
   I instructed the State Department to support the 
partition plan.41
Until that point, all had not yet been lost.  For in fact, three rather
than two committees had eventually been set up, one to clarify the partition
plan, a second to develop a plan for a unitary state and a third to attempt
conciliation.  Conciliation, however, was hopeless in an atmosphere governed
by military threats on one side and a win-lose strategy on the other.  As
Horowitz describes it, 
Each subcommittee was composed of members who sponsored, 
favoured and advocated the plan which they were asked 
to clarify.  No contact was made between the two 
subcommittees with a view to finding some basis of 
agreement or to diminish the gap of disagreement between 
the two opposing views.42
This strange procedure was widely commented upon.  So much for the
committe on conciliation.  So much for the role of the U.N. as a moderator. 
The die was cast.  The majority report on partition and its proposed
resolution favouring partition would be dealt with first by the General
Assembly in a win-lose drama.  But then the U.N. would have to become a
legislator and would need to acquire legal authority and enforcement powers or
induce Great Britain to play that role.
(H.)  BRITAIN'S REACTION TO UNSCOP
     43p. 6.
     44The division over partition or a federal state was not as fundamental. 
For both were proposals for an economic union with two divided political
entities based on ethnic lines as Lisicky (p. 70, Minutes, Aug. 27 meeting of
UNSCOP) had pointed out.  Both were partition plans, one vesting sovereign
authority in the units, the other in the federal government in order to
control immigration.
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The key to implementing the Majority Report was Britain's reaction, for
even to arrange a Trusteeship over Jerusalem, Britain's active agreement was a
prerequisite.  Blom, in his Memorandum to UNSCOP on the "Essential Factors in
a Solution to the Palestine Question" argued that, "no Trusteeship agreement
for Palestine could be effected unless it met the approval of the United
Kingdom Government".43  His argument was a legal one.  For the U.N. to assume a
trusteeship, crucial to Jerusalem and critical to providing an interim
authority, Britain had to transfer the authority over the Mandate.
UNSCOP had been most united and most divided44 over Britain's role.  They
were united in holding that the mandate had been legal in the first place,
that Britain continued to retain that mandatory authority and that the mandate
was no longer workable.  But some of the committee members, such as Garcia-
Granados and Fabregat, wanted to hold Britain responsible for its failure.  It
is this division in style and approach that the committee members experienced
as the msot divisive -- not the substance of the issue.  As Garcia-Granados
records, this division appeared right in the beginning over the issue of the
chairmanship which Great Britain and the United States, with the cooperation
of Hov, had prearranged for Sandstrom but which was challenged by the
nomination of Granados by Fabregat.  It emerged most acutely in the rsponse of
the various members to Britain's sentence of three Jewish terrorists to death. 
We had learned who were to make up the majority and 
the minority of UNSCOP:  the majority, a preponderance 
of jurists and diplomats -- discreet, serious, 
conservative; the minority, men who had lived through 
political persecution in the battle for freedom, 
perhaps undisciplined, perhaps scorners of convention, 
but convinced that the line of justice lies somewhere 
between the truths of heart and head.45
It was in response to Granados initiative to petition Britain for clemency
against the death sentences imposed on the three condemned terrorists that
Salazar told Granados, "Yesterday, you cornered us into voting for the
resolution.  It was a clever manoeuvre, but I assure you, this is the last
time you will slap England with my hand."46
     47Ad Hoc p. 3.
     48Statement of Sir Arthur Creech-Jones to the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Palestinian Question, September 26, 1947.  Official records of the second
session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question,
p. 4.  Creech-Jones told the United Nations that the British would withdraw by
August 1, 1948.  The British decision to terminate the Mandate by May 15, with
complete military withdrawal by August 1, 1948.  The British decision to
terminate the Mandate by May 15, with complete military withdraqwal by August
1, was officially announced by Creech-Jones in a speech to the House of
Commons, December 18.  Bevin had confidentially informed Marshall of the
decision to withdraw by May 15 on November 28, one day prior to the United
Nations General Assembly vote in favour of partition. (Evan Wilson, p. 217,
footnote #1)  Sir Alec Kikbud in his memoirs, From the Wings (London, 1976)
claimed that, "This renunciation was prompted by the acceptance by the United
Nations of a resolution providing for the partition of Palestine into three
states, one Arab, one Jewish and one international". (p.1)  The fact is,
Britain renounced the Mandate two months before partition was endorsed by the
U.N. on November 29th.  Arthur Koestler referred to the British decision to
appeal to the U.N. to help resolve the dispute and then reject its judgement
because the judgement entailed enforcing that resolution as "no longer
diplomacy but sheer Harpo Marx logic".  (cf. Zaslofff (1952), p. 66, fn. 7.)
The division over condemning Britain or remaining neutral did not
coincide with the supporters of the Majority and Minority Reports.  The
Yugoslavs were very critical of the U.K. but supported the Minority Report. 
In any case, just as in the case of the Arabs, both recommended solutions
unacceptable to Britain.  For Britain's interests were ignored in the
competing sets of recommendations, though Britain endorsed the principles of
early termination of the Mandate and early independence recommended by
UNSCOP.47  Britain had not been given a clear mandate or support to impose its
own solution.  In the Majority Report, Britain was being asked to oversee the
transition to a solution it had pointedly rejected in the full expectation
that the task would be extremely difficult, very costly and, possibly if not
probably, very bloody.  For Britain, civil war was not just inevitable, but
perhaps even desirable, since the result of the civil war might provide
Britain with its best opportunity to retain a role in Palestine (via a
Transjordanian takeover of Arab Palestine).  Though this had not been part of
the UNSCOP considerations, it was certainly a feasible option for the British.
In September 1947, after the UNSCOP majority had recommended partition,
but before the general assembly had considered the issue, Britain decided to
withdraw from Palestine.  Speaking before the General Assembly on the 26th of
September, Creech Jones, announced that he had been instructed by his
Government to announce with all solemnity that, in the  absence of a
settlement, it had to plan for an early withdrawal of British forces and of
the British administration from Palestine.48
The decision to withdraw may have been an attempt to derail the upcoming
General Assembly debate on partition since the implementation of the UNSCOP
     49It should be noted that Garcia-Granados, in his own            was the
only one who had "strong doubts that Britain would cooperate in carrying out
our solution". (p. 241-243, 6-6 (1948))  Granados interpreted the Britishy
stand as the beginning of an effort, "to sabotage the majority recommendation
for partition". (p. 248)
     50Creech-Jones in a letter to Elizabeth Monroe much later, after listing
all the reasons for U.K. withdrawal, citing the episode in which two sergeants
were hung as having "struck a deadly blow against British patience and pride". 
(Creech-Jones Paper, October 23, 1961) cf. Louis (1989), p. 475-477.
     51Wilson, p. 209-10.
     52cf. Zasloff, op. cit., p. 68.
     53Wm. Roger Louis (1984), p. 473 though he also, more correctly depicted
the hanging of two British sergeants as the turning point.
     54Michael Cohen in "Why Britain Left:  the End of the Mandate" argues
that, "Three factors above all were responsible for the British decision to
leave Palestine -- American pressure and intervention; the undermining of
British rule in Palestine itself; and the escalation of illegal immigraiton
during 1947.  These combined had by the summer of 1947 broken the British will
to stay on in Palestine." (1988, p. 220.)  The will had been broken, but not
majority report depended on British co-operation as well as that of the
parties to the dispute.49  The catalyst may have been the hanging of the two
British sergeants by Jewish terrorists mentioned earlier50 or the UNSCOP report
itself.  In the cabinet meeting in which the decision was made.  Bevin pointed
to the danger of the United Nations adopting an unworkable solution in the
belief that it could rely on the United Kingdom for implementation.  He was
opposed to British involvement in implementation of the majority or minority
solutions, or any solution not having Arab and Jewish agreement.  In his view,
it was better for the United Nations to face realistically the need to
implement its own decision.51
The British public was tired of the cost of administering troublesome
Palestine.  Anglo-American unity was being hurt by anti-British pressure over
Palestine in the United states.  The Arab League was exerting pressure on the
United Kingdom.  At the same time, the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations had broken
down and Egypt was hauling the United Kingdom before the United Nations over
the latter's occupation of the Sudan.  Further, the United Kingdom was
exploring alternative military options in Kenya and Cyrenaica to replace the
planned base in the Negev, making Palestine dispensable.52  Palestine had
become an economic, political and even a military liability.
The British, in effect, rejected the UNSCOP report and decided to wash
their hands of Palestine.  William Roger Louis wrote that the UNSCOP report
was the catalyst not the cause,53 but it was more the final straw and the
excuse to evacuate.54
the desire fostered by their own rational calculations.  The UNSCOP Report
undermined even the desire by showing their calculations were totally wrong. 
"The general crystallization of British sentiment in favour of withdrawal did
not necessarily contradict the Foreign Office's hope of preserving Britain's
political and strategic position by relying on the probable action of the
United Nations.  It was a rational and indeed ingenious calculation, as the
Zionists at the time recognized.  It was based on the assumption that even
biased or obtuse observers would not endorse partition, because the creation
of a Jewish state would precipitate civil war.  The Foreign Office also
assumed that the Soviet Union and the United States on this issue as on others
would gravitate into opposite  camps and that such influences as Catholocism
wold militate against the Jews.  The British, in short, hoped that the United
Nations would support an independent binational state in which Jewish rights
would be guaranteed and the promise of a national home more or less fulfilled. 
As it turned out, the British merely reconfirmed taht the United Nations
special committees as well as the United Nations General Assembly did not
operate on British rational assumptions." (Wm. Roger Louis (1988), p. 20)
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Bevin was set on leaving Palestine in a state of chaos as the civil
service formulated British plans for `masterly inactivity', a plan formulated
even before the UNSCOP report was made official on September 1st, even before
it was clear that the committee would vote for partition.55  The U.N. was faced
with a report which required a minimum transition period of two years and an
interim co-operating administrative authority.  Neither would be available. 
Henceforth, British concern was with damage control -- how to preserve as much
of Arab Palestine as possible by absorption into Transjordan.56  A key element
for the U.N. obtaining legal authority over Palestine or even administrative
cooperation of Britain was missing.
Another key factor was enforcement.  Blom had said in his Memorandum
that, "the most practicable course might well be to designate the United
Kindom as the administering authority and to make it responsible for the
enforcement measures".57  Others would provide the funding.  Blom agreed that
local hostility to the British might be a problem, but if the role was short-
term and the solution definite, it seemed the only feasible scenario.
But these two key conditions for partition to be effective were absent
before the General Assembly even began to debate the UNSCOP report.  Further,
not only was Britain unwilling to enter into a legal contractual arrangement
with the U.N. to assume the legal authority from Britain, not only was it
unwilling to provide the military forces to back up a U.N. decision, but it
was not even willing to cooperate administratively in implementing a decision
unacceptable to itself.
     58(1974), p. 73.  Snetsurger goes on to cite Trygve Lie's statement in his
Memoirs, Cause of Peace (p. 163) that "most countries expected Britain...to do
its utmost toward carrying the action through."  But this assertion was made
when Britain referred the problem to the U.N.  It was a statement of a moral
expectation not of an empirical one.  Granados records in his memoirs that,
"the United States still believed tht Britain would cooperate with us, despite
all indications to the contrary.  Johnson, the American member of our
subcommittee, clung stubbornly to the idea that the British should be the
interim authority.  I was increasingly convinced that we could expect only
confusion and sabotage from the British.  At one point I said privately to
Johnson:  `Do you really think it is useful to propose that the British govern
Palestine during the tansitional period?  They will not help to implement
partition; on the contrary, they will obstruct it.'  Johnson shook his head:
`I'm sure that in the end, they will cooperate,' he said.  `What reason drives
you to believe that?' I asked.  `Their statement is explicit.  The loathe
everything we are doing here.'  `They will cooperate -- you'll see,' Johnson
said.  `They must.  It is their responsibility and they will have to assume
it.'  I said no more.  I could only conjecture that he had information not
available to me.  Perhaps the United States had a quiet understanding with
Britain."
     59Geoffrey Furlonge, Palestine is My Country:  The Story of Musa Alami,
London: 1969, p. 149.  Even Alami's biography is sceptical.  "It seem more
likely, therefore, that he (Bevin) was already resigned to the idea that Great
Britain might leave Palestine, but that, speaking to an Arab and having much
personal sympathy with Musa's arguments against withdrawal, he was putting the
best face he could on the matter by representing his move as a device to
secure a free hand for carrying on." (p. 149)
(I.)  THE AMERICAN REACTION TO UNSCOP
The real issue was why the U.S. refused to recognize this fact (my
italics) in the face of all evidence and stubbornly insisted on clinging to
the belief that the U.K. would `carry the ball'.  On October 3, Johnson still
assumed that a British constabulary would police the transition, a position
openly and explicitly rejected by Britain.  Snetsurge explains this paradox by
asserting that there "was a firm belief in Washington that London, despite
statements that indicated the opposite, wold cooperate in the
implementation".58  This is a tautology.  They believed it because they
believed it.  But why?  Was there any evidence of a private arrangement
between the U.S. and the U.K.?
There is some evidence given in the record of the early Novembe 1947
meeting between Musa Alami and Bevin where Bevin assures Alami that, "Great
Britain, he repeated, could not carry on as things were; she would not be
allowed to leave but would be begged to remain; and if once given a free hand
he could solve the problem".59
The evidence is meagre indeed.  Britain, at best, hoped the U.N. would
call on it to remain in desperation, but by November that hope was very slim
indeed.  Why then did the U.S. cling to this illusory belief?  Was it
unnatural?
     60FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, pp. 1173-74, see also pp. 1147-51 and 1162-63; cf.
also Dan Tschigi (p. 229) who interprets this as Marshall's plan to create an
image of a policy in the absence of one.  As the reader shall see, I interpret
this as the beginning of Marshall's leadership of the State Department effort
to undermine partition.
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Marshall had set the lines of U.S. policy in a meeting with its U.N.
delegation on October 3rd:
(1) no U.S. troops to support partition;
(2) partition unlikely to pass if no U.S. forces;
(3) no U.S. efforts to persuade others;
(4) if partition fails, then trusteeship.60
Truman had been adamant about not wanting the American military in the
Middle East.  But he also wanted a peaceful resoloution of the Palestine
problem "based on the desire to see promises kept (the Balfour Declaration and
the Mandate) and human             relieved (the Jewish refugees in Europe)".61 
He was opposed to any arm twisting to get other states to support partition.  
I have never approved of the practice of the strong 
imposing their will on the weak, whether among men or 
among nations.  We had aided Greece.  We had, in fact, 
furthered the independence of Greece.  But that did 
not make satellites of these nations or compel them to 
vote with us on the partitioning of Palestine or any 
other matter.62
The first of Marshall's policies followed Truman's direction.  The second was
a prediction, not an action, though much State Department behaviour tried to
ensure its validity.  It was undermined by Truman's direct order to the State
Department "to support the partition plan"63 made public on October 11th
following the Arab League Council's instructions "to move troops to the
Palestine border" of which Truman was informed on October 9th.  Since Truman
had no particular formula or timetable for implementing partition, support for
trusteeship was not inconsistent in his eyes with such a goal.
The U.S. State Department did not expect partition to pass even with its
support.  The absence of any means of enforcement would be part of the
sabotage of partition.  The repeated assertion that the U.K. would accept
responsibility was, on the one hand, a cover-up, and, on the other hand, a
sincere belief, but only, as we shall try to show, if partition were defeated.
But if the intention was to undermine partition, why did McLintock
propose to move up the partition date to ensure "London would be left holding
     64A key motive was "to make sure neither American...nor Russian troops,
nor any form of voluntary constabulary (my italics) be employed" except
possibly for Jerusalem.  FRUS, 1947, pp. 1210, 1233. cf. p. 1282.  Loy
Henderson, in a meeting on Nov. 24th, predicted a successful vote for
partition would entail Security Council, hence Soviet, hence Soviet troop
involvement.
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the bag"?  The U.S. did join the U.S.S.R. in a compromise to cut the
implementation period from two years to a few months.64
Let us pause for some clarification in setting out the different
threads.  The predominant interpretation of American policy was set out
clearly by Zasloff.
American backing of partition apparently was based largely 
upon public opinion pressure and the Zionist political 
influence.65  It was evident from American conduct at the 
United Nations that the United States still desired a 
minimum of Russian involvement in the Middle East and 
hoped that Britain would lend assistance to the 
implementation of the partition plan.  The United States 
was obviously taking a risk that the implementation of 
partition would not require a United Nations force, for 
the co-participation of Russian troops in a United Nations 
body, which it could be assumed the Soviet Union would 
demand, would have been surely contrary to American 
wishes.66
There are six strands to understanding American motives -- the role of
the Zionist lobby, the role of public opinion, the Russian issue, the role of
the Arabs, and the expectations of the U.N. and the British.  About American
policy on the Soviet Union there is unanimous agreement.  it was the one
subject on which the White House and the State Department were in accord.  Our
central issue is the expectattions of Britain.  But we first have to clarify
sthe mistaken impression that Truman's policy and support of partition was a
product of the Zionist lobby and/or public opinion and the role Arab behaviour
and American expectations of the U.N. played in policy formulations.
On the role of the Zionist lobby, Wm. Roger Louis summarized it well.  
He (Truman) resented the attackes by the Zionists.  He 
was sensitive to the charge that the Jews indirectly 
manipulated American foreign policy.  In particular he 
became angered at critics who             the integrity 
of the office of the Presidency by insinuating that he 
was a capture of the New York Jews.67
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Truman's famous Yom Kippur statement on Palestine in 1946 was equivocal at
best and not the unqualified support for partition as widely interpreted.  He
was sensitive to the promise to the Jews and the plight of Jews in Europe, but
he was equally annoyed by the              pressure of the Zionists and the
behaviour of Rabbi Silver who headed the American Zionists and whom he banned
from the White House during his tenure for daring to pound his desk and make
"demands" on the President.  Truman was not in office to play the role of
prophet, Karl Marx or even Jesus Christ for the Jews -- all phrases taken from
his own correspondence.68
But there was another aspect to the Zionist lobby -- its subtle, backrow
work in contrast to the histrionic performances of its leaders.  It involved
David Noles, Truman's White House aide and link to the ethnic organization and
an enamoured follower of Rabbi Stephen Wise's `enlightened' Zionism.  In
involved non-Jews like Chuck Clifford who was politically sensitive and
sympathetic to Zionist goals.  And it involved mid-west lawyers like Granoff
who headed the local B'nai Brith and happened to be Eddy Jacobson's lawyer,
Harry Truman's old partner in the haberdashery business.  It was Jacobson who
got Truman to meet Chaim Weizmann, critical to offsetting Truman's negative
attitude to the Zionist lobby in general.
American policy was not based largely on the efforts of the Zionist
lobby.  Nor was public opinion that important.  Most Americans did not know
that Palestine was still governed by Britain under the auspecis of a League of
Nations Mandate.  Public opinion, however, reinforced White House policy in
two issues.  According to a mid-1947 Gallup poll, 60% of Americans were
opposed to the use of the American military to keep peace in Palestine and 72%
were content to let the U.N. solve the problem.69  The United States was
content to follow the U.N. lead.  Arab military foced the American hand.  To
forestall the necessity to send any troops of any kind to Palestine, America
openly backed the U.N. majority report on October 11th as a show of support to
              Arab threats.
but who would be xpected to counter those threats on the ground?  Here
we return to our central dilemma -- did the U.S. sincerely believe Britain
could be induced or embarrassed into using its forces to impose a solution
with which it so profoundly disagreed, which ran directly counter to its
national interests and its explicit statements in the U.N.?
     70cf. Foreign Relations 1948 V, pp. 592-5 on Wadsworth's           with
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The make-up of the U.S. delegation at the U.N. was critical in this
regard.  Loy Henderson had proposed that George Wadsworth,70 the Iraq
ambassador, an Arabist and anti-Zionist, head the delegation and the full
session of the U.N.  On the advise of David Noles, Truman decided that the
delegation could not be so openly anti-Zionist and appointed as head of the
delegation Major General John H. Hilldring, who as Assistant Secretary of
State for the Occupied Areas, had become sympathetic to the plight of the Jews
in Europe.  Thus, the Wadsworth and Beeley deal.
Thus, the head of the delegation was sympathetic to Zionism and the
delegation included Eleanor Roosevelt, an even more explicit sympathizer.  But
the direction of policy at the U.N. was dictated by the State Department with
the occasional modification by a direct instruction by the White House. 
Marshall and the British were playing a game, each trying to manoeuvre the
other into taking the primary responsibility for enforcing whatever solution
the U.N. determined to be appropriate.  At the same time, Marshall was
sympathetic to the British outlook and looked forward to the failure of the
partition recommendation.71
There is extensive evidence for this clarification of a policy of riding
two horses which appeared to be going in different directions (supporting
partition and believing the U.K. would enforce it) when the underlying policy
ws condemning partition and believing the U.K. would enforce the revised
policy.  Dean Risk, in a meeting with Lionel Gelber, a Canadian working for
the Jewish Agency in New York, threatened that the U.S. would side with
Britain unless the Pan York and Pan Carmel, two illegal immigrant ships, were
stopped while the U.N. deliberated the UNSCOP Report.  This threat can be
interpreted as an effort to not sabotage the U.S. pro-partition stance.  But
give Risk's clear aversion to partition and support for trusteeship, it would
be much more plausible to interpret this effort at intermediating the Zionist
attempts to follow up on their success with the Exodus as a threat to
American-Anglo cooperation when partition was defeated.
But the State Department's scenario for the defeat of prtition while
they gave surgace support to it was falling apart.  The United States had
counted on the Soviet Union voting against partition in spite of early
evidence in the Gromyko speech that such support was a fall back position and
the Czech support of partition.  On October 13th, Tsmapkin, the Soviet
     72cf. Horowitz, pp. 239 and 256-7, and Ro'i pp. 84-85.
     73cf. Granados (pp. 253-257).
     74The U.S.         disagreement with Tsarapkin's 10 point proposal to the
subcommittee on implementation on November 3, 1947, was clarified in a
telegram by Gordon Knox (a State Department adviser) that the U.S. "would not
agree to any plan...which placed the administrator of Palestine under the
Security Council and therby gave the Soviet Union a negative control over its
development through use of, or threat to use, the veto power".  FRUS, 1947,
pp. 1231-34.
delegate announced its support for partition with qualifications having to do
with border adjustments, the period of transition and Jerusalem.72
If the State Department wanted to undermine partition, why were the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. so cooperative in the four party sub-committee (including
Canada and Guatemala) dealing with implementation.  There are two reasons. 
First, it was the U.S.S.R. that compromised by far the most on the date of
turnover, on bailing out of insisting on a Security Council         , hence,
Soviet presence, etc.  America was required to make few compromises and it
could not appear to its close allies -- Canada and Guatemala -- as
deliberately destructive.  When the Canadian - Guatemalan - U.S.A. - U.S.S.R.
subcommittee gave a unanimous report on implementation on November 10th, it
was explicitly rejected by Britain.  On November 13th, Britain changed the
date of evacuation from May 1 to Aug. 1, insisting that the U.K. would retain
authority until the end, that Britain alone would decide when that end would
be and there would be no transition.73
Even Johnson became frustrated and angry.  But it did not change the
U.S. policy of frustrating every realistic attempt to work out a system of
enforcement.  If the policy had only been to keep out the U.S.S.R.74 there was
always the possibility of a U.N. peace force made up of military from
countries such as Canada.  The real U.S. policy coming out of the State
Department was to undermine partition all the way unless given explicit
instructions to the contrary by Truman.
The U.S. supported partition but the State Department did not want it to
work so Trusteeship would be implemented.  The U.S.S.R., according to the
State Department, also supported partition but did not want it to work but,
instead wanted chaos to ensue to give them a bench head in the Middle East. 
Out of contrasting malevolent motives, (assuming those were in fact the
motives of the U.S.S.R.) a compromise report, with the assistance of Canada dn
Guatemala,           provided for Security Council supervision of partiton and
the U.S.S.R. exclusion from the Palestine Commission to be made up of small
states only.
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(J.)  THE VOTE FOR PARTITION
The high drama that preceded the passage of the U.N. resolution
supporting partition has been            in many places.75  Much of the debate
concerns the efforts of the U.S. to persuade others to support partition in
the last two days preceding the November 29th vote.  The Russian support for
Partition -- which Eleanor Roosevelt alon among the American delegation
predicted -- was a sever blow to State Department calculations.  But all was
not lost.
The United States had given up all pretext that Britain would take
responsibility for implementing partition.  As Herschel Johnson said in his
address to the Ad Hoc Committee on November 23rd, just prior to its vote on
the 25th, 
It was essential to find some plan of implementation 
which could make such utilization as possible of the 
experience of the Mandatory Power and its presence in 
Palestine and its present responsibility,         
involving the Mandatory Power in the responsibility for 
implementing a plan which, according to its own words, 
did not have the approval of both of the two principal 
parties concerned.76
British military enforcement was clearly ruled out by British rejection
onNovember 13th of the subcommittee's proposal based on a Canadian compromise
that the Mandate terminate on January 1, 1948, with British troop withdrawal
scheduled for May 1, 1948 during which period the Palestine Commission
reponsible to the Security Council would supervise the setting up of Arab and
Jewish           and would organize the           governments.  British
administrative cooperation was ruled out.  In fact, even British cooperation
was ruled out as Britain insisted, it and it alone would retain total
authority until it left and would not            any interim authority or
transition period.  Herschel Johnson still clung to the illusory thread of
British cooperation which was implicitly denied in the Nov. 13th rejection and
explicitly denied on November 3rd when the new subcommittee plan was rejected
as well providing for Britain maintaining order until the U.N. assumed
administrative responsibility on Oct. 7, 1948.  There would be no cooperation
between the Mandatory Power and the Palestine Commission.  There would be no
progressive transfer of power.  There would be no shared authority.
Thus, when the Ad Hoc Committee voted on November 25, 1947 to accept
partiiton by a vote of 25:13 with 17 abstentions, including Belgium, France,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and New Zealand and two absentees, the
Philippines and Paraguary, the delegates knew no means to enforce partition
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had been arranged, no interim period would be available to ensure a smooth
transition and no U.N. authority.
In spite of this reality, there was a widespread misperception, shared
and augmented by the Secretary General that, "The responsibility for solving
the Palestine problem had been transferred to the United Nations."77 
Responsibility had not been transferred.  The U.N. had been asked for a
recommendation.  The only part of the recommendation the U.K. accepted was to
quit.
The momentum and the illusion of responsibility, however, was there even
though there was no enforcement provision, no political authority set up by
the U.N. would or could legally be in place and no administrative apparatus
would be available.  The U.N. had come to believe its own moral imperatives
could be translated into the real instruments of power.
A vote of 25:13 was not decisive.  One more vote would be needed in the
General Assembly, and then only if the no votes did not increase.  Since
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and New Zealand were expected to
support partition, the task was to ensure the negative vote did not increase
by more than two.  The pressure now bore on those who abstained.78
If we follow the shifts in allegiance of countries such as Greece,
Haiti, the Philippines, Costa Rica, Liberia, Yugoslavia, Paraguay, and Chile,
Cuba and South Africa, one can get a sense of how the partition vote achieved
a decisive two-thirds majority of 33:13 with 10 abstentions and 1 absentee. 
The list includes Chile and Costa Rica who supported the Nov. 25th Ad Hoc
Committee resolution, and cuba and Siam, the only two non-Muslim countries who
opposed it.
Let us take the negative vote which in absolute numbers stayed the same
but with a gain of Chile from the support column rather that from those that
abstained and a loss of Siam.  The Siam defection from the negative ranks is
easy to explain.  It was not a result of political pressure but of
serendipity.  
Because of a revolution in Siam, its delegation here had 
been disavowed by the new government; its chief delegate, 
who earlier had supported the Arabs, left the United 
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States.  Siam had no bona fide representative, and could 
not vote.79
The negative vote of Greece made up for the loss of Siam.  Greece had
abstained in the vote on the 25th.  On the 26th, Greece announced that it
would oppose partition.  Since Greece at the end of 1946 was on the verge of
collapse, since in February of 1947 the British let the Americans know that
economic assistance would cease in March and since the U.S., to prevent a
communist victory, decided to extend aid to Greece, the U.S. was clearly in a
position to influence the Greek vote, or at least ensure Greece abstained. 
Louis claims that, "Niles used business connections in an abortive effort to
swing the Greek vote,"80 but cites no evidence.  The failure to sideline
Greece, if not reverse its pro-Arab stand, does not suggest the United States
used coercive pressure of any kind otherwise one could not imagine Greece
supporting the Arabs.
The only other non-Muslim country to vote against partition was Cuba
whose Ambassador, Guillermo Bolt, was "recalcitrantly pro-Arab", claimed the
Costa Rican vote had been purchased with a $75,000 bribe,81 but this clearly
appears as part of the opposition throwing dirt and it is surprising that Wm.
Roger Louis allows the accusation without comment.  The Costa Rican delegate,
Ricardo Fournier, complained of being offered a political bribe from the other
side when he, 
indignantly told me that the Arabs had offered to support 
Costa Rica for the Trusteeship Council provided Fournier 
would change his pro-partition attitude.  `I told him 
that I would not sell my vote or sacrifice my honor'.82
Cuba and Greece, both easily subject to American pressures, particularly
Greece, voted against partition and were the only non-Muslim states to do so. 
Cuba's vote was attributed to the political ambitions of the delegate.83 
Chile's shift from the support to the abstention column was a surprise.  Santa
Cruz, the Chilean subordinate who replaced the chief delegate who resigned
claimed that Chile had 
a special interest in the Arab nations which derives from 
an unchanging friendship, and the fact that we have always 
shared with them similar points of view on the majority of 
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the problems which have come up for study in the United 
Nations.84
This order of reversal came directly from President Gonzales Videla in
Santiago, who before taking office had been President of the Pro-Palestine
Committee of Chile.  Since that Committee was a pro-Zionist lobby, one can
only speculate on what Arab-Chilean deal induced the dramatic change.85  [Note: 
get search of Chilean archives]
What about the pressures in the other direction?  Why did Haiti and
Liberia, who previously abstained, shift to support partition?  Why did the
Philippines and Paraguay who had been absent on the vote on the 25th, vote for
partition on the 29th?  Why did Yugoslavia continue to abstain?
The Yugoslavs had intended to vote against partition on the 25th. 
Vladimir Simic as a  member of UNSCOP had opposed partition.  Vladimir's
brother, Stanoje Simic, was the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Yugoslavia and
the chief delegate to the U.N.  As he explained his intention to vote against
partition to Granados, "We signed the minority report and nobody took the
trouble to discuss it.  At least it should have been a matter of courtesy.  So
we are sorry to vote against the majority report."86  Granados was unable to
persuade him to set aside his sense of being slighted, but Pruszynski from
Poland, when alerted by Granados, was evidently more persuasive and convinced
them to abstain.87
Was it merely a matter of reasoning?  Or was political pressure brought
to bear on Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc?  Yaacov Ro's on his study of
Soviet policy vis a vis Israel, claims the Yugoslav opposition to partiton,
even in UNSCOP, was a feint until a unified Soviet bloc policy had been
determined.
Czechoslovac-Yugoslav disparity (in UNSCOP) seems to 
have been a manifestation of the tacit agreement between 
the Soviet Union and the East European People's Democracies 
that the latter were to enjoy maximum manoeuvrability on 
issues on which the international community had not yet 
made its decision... In this way, the U.S.S.R. was able 
to stand simultaneously on both sides of the fence.88
Perhaps the Polish delegate pointed out the room for deviation was over now
that the international community had decided.  Maybe the Poles convinced the
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Yugoslav of the intrinsic merits of partition.  Whatever the case, the
Yugoslavs were induced by the Poles, not by the Americans, to staying in the
abstention column.
Like Yugoslavia, the Philippines also had a large domestic Muslim
population and could be said to be susceptible to domestic pressures to vote
against partition.  The Philippines was absent from the vote on the 25th. 
Granados claims the support of the Philippines was won in the last 48 hours
for the 26th the Philippines had been expected to vote `No'.  Chief Justice
Felix Frankfurten, had long ago set aside his resentments that he, Benjamin C.
Cohen and their mentor Branders, had been shunted aside in the Zionist
leadership stakes in the early 1920's in the conflict between the grass roots
politics of Pinsk and the elite rationalism of Washington.  On the urging of
David Niles, he corralled his fellow jurist Frank Murphy and they paid a visit
to the Philippino Ambassador in Washington.  More material pressure was used
by the senators who sent a telegram to the President of the Philippines noting
that a financial aid package to his country was pending in Congress and a
negative vote on partition could have an adverse effect.  But the most
effective pressure was probably that of Julius Edelstein, an American civil
servant and a personal friend of the Philippino President.  The American
Embassy located Edelstein in England in the middle of the night who wakened
his friend in Manila from his afternoon siesta.89  Whether high level judicial
argument with the ambassador, material inducements of senators for the
Philippines or friendship was the most critical, it is clear that the
Philippines changed its mind and voted for rather than against partition.
Paraguay too was absent on the vote on the 25th and supported partition
on the 29th.  Dr. Cesar Acosta, the chief delegate, had abstained simply
because he had not yet received instructions.90  If the final vote had not been
delayed by expansive speeches, into which the Arabs were drawn to duplicate in
response, the U.S. Thanksgiving holiday and the French move for a last minute
48 hour delay, the Paraguayan vote might have ended up as an abstention rather
than a supporting vote.
Liberia, a country made up of and ruled by the descendents of ex-
American slaves, was another case.  It, along with the Philippines and Haiti,
had been specifically targeted for concentrated effort by the Zionist lobby.91 
Robert Nathan, an economist phoned the Liberian delegate to warn that unless
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they voted for partition, Secretary of State Stettinais would have to call his
friend, Harvey Firestone, Jr. whose tire and rubber company dominated the
Liberian economy.  In fact, as Grose notes, Stettinais did place a phone call,
to President Tubman of Liberia itself. Liberia would not abstain but voted for
partition.
Haiti was in danger of actually voting against partition. Granados, who
sat next to the Haitian delegate, writes,
I have no idea what strings were pulled in the case of 
Haiti, which at the beginning was fully partitionist.  
The Haitian delegate, M. Vieux, declared before the Ad 
Hoc Committee that he would vote for partition...The 
day before the vote, a very embarrassed M. Vieux told 
me that he would have to change his yes to no because 
of new instructions from his government.92
Granados learned that the President of Haiti would countermand that
order and instruct a yes vote and the abstention was a delaying tactic in the
face of conflicting messages.  Vieux received his pro-partition instructions
on Nov. 28th.  Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, after a call from
Nachman Goldmann, sent a cable to Dumarsais Estime, President of haiti,
reinforced by a message from Robert H. McBride, urging a vote for partition. 
It seems clear that Granados' belief that, "At no time did their (the
American) campaign go over the heads of the delegates to the various
governments involved."93
He was clearly wrong.  Truman's contention that nothing had been
undertaken whereby the strong imposed its will on the weak or tht the `direct
approach' of lobbying `could never gain my approval' seems disingenuous.94
What significance did all these Arab and pro-Zionist lobbies have in the
final vote?  The partition resolution had 30 votes more or less in the bag. 
The anti-partition vote had 13 votes in the bag, but lost Siam due to
serendipity.  The anti-partition group needed to gain 4 votes to defeat
partition.  It kept Greece with promises of the Muslim bloc to support Greek
and to reinforce the Greek propensity to vote against partition.  It won
Chile's vote by direct pressure on Santiago.  It lost the Philippines, as the
only other potential gain, because of the Zionist lobby.  Without the lobby,
the vote would have been 31:14 with Haiti and Liberia added to the abstention
column.  There would have been a clear margin of victory in any case.
David Horowitz's claim that the U.S. (via David Niles) exertion of the
`weight of its influence almost at the last hour' swung the final vote in
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favour of partition is exaggerated.95  But the figures do not substantiate this
view.  El Salvador, for example, which tended to be anti-partitionist for
religious reasons, abstained on both the 25th and the 29th.
The pro-Zionist lobby secured the victory by a comfortable margin.  It
was not decisive, however.  There is evidence that if the Arabs had not been
so crass in their lobbying for votes and so uncompromising in their positions,
that a number of the states which abstained, such as Argentina, El Salvador,
Honduras, and Mexico, might have been converted to vote against partition.
It is more correct to say that the Zionists' work secured them victory
though it was not decisive in making it.  Arabs intransigence, belligerency,
uncompromising opposition and crass offers to win votes did more to ensure the
victory than all the sophisticated efforts of the Zionists.
(K.)  THE PROSPECTS OF THE U.N. IMPLEMENTING PARTITION, IF PASSED
The recommendation for partition was of dubious merit.  If partition had
been accepted by the Jews and Arabs, it would, as Crossman96 once said, "make
both Jews and Arabs independent and responible for their relations with each
other."97  But such an outcome depended on a very large "if."  Further, the
reoslution itself was full of defects foreseeable at the time -- all of which
have already been outlined, namely the United Nations lack of legal status as
an administering authority given that Palestine was not to become a
trusteeship, the absence of in-place administrative machinery to implement
partition and the force to back it up, etc.  One delegate expressed those
views succinctly.
My Government regrets to note that the method of 
enforcement suggested in the report now before this 
Assembly does not appear to satisfy this essential 
condition ... not only has the system suggested in 
the report not got the necessary force behind it, 
but that it is deficient also from the organizational 
point of view.  It may therefore be feared that the 
commission which is to operate in Palestine under the 
authority and auspices of the United Nations will be 
placed in a very difficult situation, possibly even 
in a distressing situation as regards the prestige of 
our Organization.
The manner in which partiiton was passed was deemed by some observers to
have seriously damaged even further the one source of authority the United
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Nations did have -- its moral uathority.  As de Azcarate98 described it, the
discussion in the General Assembly went on 
in a deplorable atmosphere of passion, frivolity and 
confusion, crowned by a vote which the Arabs still 
regard as irregular if not null and void.  Nevertheless 
...If the plan...has its weak sides and some dangerous 
omissions, it must be said, on the other hand, if no 
decision at all were taken, it would have still more 
serious consequences.99 
The real weight of the resolution was the pressures it placed on the
individual states who supported it to follow through with commitment and
individual action to see it realized.  The most critical of these was the
United States.
In other words, the United Nations was not being used as a moral
influence or as an international legislative body, but as a stage on which to
act out the power politics of the world, and on which the commitments of
individual states would be lined up.  Most importantly, the United Nations
would be used as a forum of the power politics of the major powers.
There are two ways, after all, to view the partition resolution. On the
one hand, the partition resolution, as it emerged from the UNSCOP report, was,
in effect, the least of all evils rather than an ideal resolution of the
conflict.  No one really loved partition -- no one.  Everyone anticipated
problems in implementing partition.  It was simply the plan with the greatest
acceptance.  The U.N. members believed some resolution of the conflict was
better than none at all, even if the prestige of the organization was put at
risk.
On the other hand, the partition plan, though unacceptable to Britain as
a political, economic and military power -- albeit a declining one -- was
acceptabel to the dominant political interests of both the U.S.A. and the
U.S.S.R.
Not all the political factors favoured partition in the U.S.A.  Though
Truman was favourably disposed to Zionist aspirations, he was not committed to
any specific timetable for Jewish statehood.  Opposing an early decision in
favour of partition were the standard arguments of American security and
economic interests in the region:  the unwillingness to alienate the Arabs, a
fear that revolutionary socialist Zionism might favour Russia, all
strengthened by a reluctance to back a proposal that might necessitate sending
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     101Eleanor Roosevelt shared this view sincerely.  "Anything that would
strengthen the foundations of a new world order would command widespread
support in U.S.  U.N. had voted for partition so U.S. should back it."  [Get
exact quote from Grose, p. 242.]
forces to the region.  Favouring partition, however, were the weight of thirty
years of Congressional resolutions and party platforms supporting Zionizst
aspirations, a desire to do something for the Jewish D.P.s in Europe, and the
conviction that the fledgling United Nations must be supported wherever
possible.  One of the most telling swing arguments for Truman could be found
in a memo of Clark Clifford's.  Clifford was Harry Truman's political advisor. 
In Clifford's view, partition would be the only possible way to avoid war in
the area and the need for American troops; at the same time it would
strengthen the United States' hand vis a vis the Russians.
This suggests that the American vote was simply based on real politic
and gave little consideration to the moral and international status of the
U.N.  But, in fact, a major reason for the U.S. support of partition was,
ironically, to strengthen the U.N.  The President provided precisely such a
rationale for voting for the UNSCOP report -- "because it was a majority
report."100  The pro-partition vote would demonstrate America's wllingness to
go along with the carefully deliberated decisions of the world body.101  
At the same time, the partition resolution satisfied the American
commitment to Jewish statehood and conveniently met pressures from the pro-
Zionist electorate of the United States.  Power politics, the pressure of the
strong            the weak, as evidenced by the last minute, intensive
American and Arab lobbies on wavering United Nations members, was not the
     102FRUS 1947, Vol. V, p. 1149.  There are conflicting accounts on the
extent the United States lobbied for partition.  According to Truman, the
United States delegation was specifically prohibited from lobbying on behalf
of partition.  But vigorous lobbying did go on.  It was undertaken by
individual congressmen, businessmen, etc. who were not acting as official
representatives of the U.S. government, though others argue that the official
prohibition against active lobbying was withdrawn as the vote neared. [ref?]
The last minute American decision to exert pressure in favour of
partition is described in Dan Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision, p. 236-38;
Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 125, 127; Zvi Ganin, Truman,
American Jewry, and Israel, 1945-1948, p. 142-46; Peter Grose, Israel in the
Mind of America, p. 248-54; David Horowitz, State in the Making, p. 300-01;
Kurzman, Genesis 1948, p. 17-21; and Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote and
the Creation of Israel, p. 66-69.  Refutation of official American support is
provided in Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 158-59, and in FRUS 1948, p. 614. 
Needless to say, both the Zionists and the Arab delegations were also involved
in intensive lobbying efforts.  Zionist activities are described in Wilson,
Ganin, Snetsinger, and Horowitz.  Garcia-Granados, The Birth of Israel, p.
262-64 describes Arab pressure tactics.
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decisive factor it was held up to be.102  The U.S. - U.S.S.R. alliance, for
very opposite and opposing motives was decisive.
The Soviets, contrary to their traditional anti-Zionist stance, had
first given the Zionists encouragement in May of 1947.  On May 14, Andrei
Gromyko announced that if bad relations between the Arabs and the Jews made a
unified state impossible, then Palestine should be separated into two
states.103  The Soviets insisted that independence be achieved as quickly as
possible, a policy which continued to govern Soviet action throughout the
debate.  On October 13, 1947, in the General Assembly, Gromyko gave partition
unequivocal endorsement.  Though the Soviet Union lacked the domestic
pressures present in the U.S.A., its policy was geared to win the support of
the American progressive constituency.  It also had its own international
agenda -- to help Jewish victims of the former common enemy, the Nazis (as
they explained it), to hurry the United Kingdom out of the Middle East, to
divide the United Kingdom and the United States, to alienate the West from the
Arabs and the Arab masses from their leaders beholden to the West, to exploit
an unstable situation, to create a precedent for the separation of Macedonia
from Greece, Armenia from Turkey or Azerbaijan from Iran.  They may have also
supported partition because they believed it was the best decision for the
Jews, the Arabs and the United Nations.104
Thus, in this rare instance, and contrary to all earlier British
calculations, the two super-powers found themselves on the same side of an
important issue before the United Nations -- a situation "tantamount to a
miracle", as Chaim Weizmann described it.  It was the support of both the
U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. which doomed the last hurrah of Britain in Palestine.
